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Abstract 
Two competing theories argue that the nonprofit sector pays differently: 
Nonprofit employees may accept lower pay to be able to do meaningful 
work for a good cause, or they may earn higher pay due to nonprofit orga-
nizations’ tax exemptions and weaker incentives to hold down wages. To 
test these opposing expectations, we use the 2005-2013 American Commu-
nity Surveys to examine pay differences among registered nurses working 
for nonprofit, for-profit, and public hospitals. We also test hypotheses that 
public and nonprofit hospitals have smaller pay disparities by gender, race, 
and relationship status. We find that pay is highest in nonprofit hospitals, 
partly because they attract better-educated and more experienced nurses, 
but partly because they pay comparable nurses more than for-profit hos-
pitals do. Furthermore, contrary to expectations, pay disparities appear to 
be largest in nonprofit hospitals. 
Keywords: wage inequality, registered nurses, nonprofit and for-profit 
comparison, selection, hospital 
Introduction 
Competing theories predict different pay patterns in nonprofit organizations. 
The donative labor theory argues that employees of the nonprofit sector earn 
less than they would in the for-profit sector, because they choose to accept lower 
pay in exchange for more meaningful work (e.g., Rose-Ackerman, 1996). Typi-
cally, this means that they are furthering a cause that they believe in, but they 
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may also be choosing work they find intrinsically motivating for other reasons. 
Nonprofits may even choose to pay below-market rates to help them select the 
most motivated workers (Benz, 2005; Borzaga & Tortia, 2006; Handy & Katz, 
1998). Perhaps because of this, the nonprofit sector has higher turnover rates 
(Gazley, 2009), with low pay being one of the most common reasons employees 
cite for leaving (Nonprofit HR Solutions, 2012). 
The emphasis on intrinsic motivation may also lead to greater pay equality 
within the sector. Wage inequality reduces job satisfaction (Card, Mas, Moretti, 
& Saez, 2012). Leete (2000) argues that nonprofits pay more equitably, in part 
because intrinsically motivated employees care more about equity. The nonprofit 
sector tends to have both less wage inequality and higher job satisfaction (Ben-
Ner, Ren, & Paulson, 2011; Leete, 2000, 2001; Preston & Sacks, 2010). 
In contrast, some argue that nonprofits pay above-market wages. Nonprofits’ 
tax advantages allow them to be more “profitable” than their for-profit coun-
terparts, but they cannot redistribute any surplus to their shareholders. This 
gives them fewer incentives to hold down costs, including wages; indeed, high 
wages might be a means of distributing retained earnings to important stake-
holders. Furthermore, hospitals, colleges, and schools may choose to become 
nonprofits to build trust with consumers, and they help build trust by investing 
in high-quality labor. 
Using data from the 2005-2013 American Community Surveys (ACS), we ex-
amine pay differences across the nonprofit, for-profit, and public sectors, fo-
cusing on registered nurses (RNs) who work for hospitals. By focusing on one 
large occupation within one industry (RNs working at hospitals make up 7.1% 
of all nonprofit employees), we are able to eliminate most differences in the 
nature and conditions of work. We first examine pay difference across hospital 
ownership and whether differences in nurses’ individual characteristics (edu-
cation, age/experience, race/ethnicity, gender, and relationship status) can ex-
plain these differences. We then look at whether the nonprofit sector has smaller 
pay differences by race/ethnicity, gender, and relationship status. We find that 
nonprofit hospitals pay their nurses more, partly due to hiring more-educated, 
higher skilled nurses. In addition, we find little evidence that nonprofit hospi-
tals have fewer wage disparities than public and for-profit hospitals. 
Does the Nonprofit Sector Pay Differently? 
Two sets of competing theories posit that the nonprofit sector pays differently 
than the public and for-profit sectors. Donative labor and intrinsic motivation 
theories argue that workers in nonprofit organizations accept lower pay because 
they value the good or service that they help produce (Frank, 1996; Hansmann, 
1980; Leete, 2001; Preston, 1989; Rose-Ackerman, 1996). Preston (1989) argues 
that accepting lower wages is similar to donating money to produce a public 
good. Frank (1996) believes that nonprofit workers are willing to work for less 
because they derive more satisfaction from their work. He finds that nonprofit 
employees have greater job satisfaction, in part because they view their employ-
ers as more socially responsible, and that they would require a large wage pre-
mium to switch to a less socially responsible employer. Rose-Ackerman (1996) 
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adds that nonprofit employees may accept lower pay when their work lines up 
with their idealism. 
The second set of theories argues that nonprofit employees earn more, be-
cause nonprofit organizations have fewer incentives to hold down wages. A 
nonprofit board cannot retain profits and does not receive financial incentives 
to monitor how the organization’s employees carry out its mission. Monitoring 
nonprofits’ performance is more difficult because they often have complex, ab-
stract, hard-to-quantify goals and lack the simple bottom line of profit (Ben-Ner, 
2006; Steinberg, 2010). This increases nonprofit managers’ discretion, which 
they can use to increase compensation for themselves and others. Nonprofits’ 
tax exemptions may also lower their costs enough to allow them to afford higher 
quality employees (Schumacher, 2009). If education and experience do not fully 
capture these higher skills, empirical studies might mistakenly find a wage pre-
mium (Byrne, 2014). For instance, Holtmann and Idson (1993) find that non-
profit nursing homes pay their nurses better because they attract higher skilled 
nurses and provide a higher quality of service, and Preston and Sacks (2010) 
believe that the nonprofit wage premium in nursing care services may be due 
to higher quality of services. The nondistribution constraint could also explain 
why nurses may be more likely to donate their labor to nonprofit hospitals. Be-
cause nonprofit hospitals cannot redistribute profits to shareholders, nurses 
may view them more favorably and be more willing to work for them. Drevs, 
Tscheunlin, and Lindenmeier (2014) find that patients view German nonprofit 
hospitals as more trustworthy and warm although, surprisingly, less competent 
than for-profit hospitals. 
The empirical findings are mixed. Several studies find that nonprofit em-
ployees earn less than other employees (e.g., Handy & Katz, 1998; Lewis, 2010; 
Steinberg, 1990), but others find that this wage difference is due to industry 
differences. Ruhm and Borkoski (2003) estimate that nonprofit employees earn 
11% less than comparable workers in other sectors but find the higher propor-
tions of part-time workers and low-paying industries in the nonprofit sector al-
most entirely explain pay differences. Leete (2001) finds that nonprofit employ-
ees earn as much as, or more than, comparable for-profit employees. Nonprofit 
employees do not appear to experience a wage penalty in human services (Ben-
Ner et al., 2011; Ruhm & Borkoski, 2003; Schumacher, 2009). Ben-Ner and Ren 
(2015) find that nonprofit and local government nursing homes in Minnesota pay 
higher wages because they delegate more decision making to their employees. 
By focusing on a single occupation in a single work setting, we remove major 
disparities in job duties across sectors. One disadvantage of this setting is that 
nonprofit, public, and for-profit hospitals have similar missions, which should 
give nurses less motivation to donate their labor to a nonprofit hospital rather 
than to perform the same work at a market wage for a for-profit hospital. How-
ever, nonprofit hospitals may, in fact, take on greater social responsibility. The 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO, 2006) estimated that even after adjusting for 
hospital size and location, the estimated share of uncompensated care in non-
profit hospitals was 0.6 percentage points higher than in for-profit hospitals. 
For-profit hospitals are more likely than public and nonprofit hospitals to pro-
vide profitable services and less likely to provide unprofitable ones (Horwitz, 
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2005), and nonprofit hospitals that convert to for-profit start providing more 
profitable services at the expense of unprofitable ones (Cutler & Horwitz, 2000). 
This may explain why volunteers are less likely to donate their time to for-profit 
hospitals (Wolff, Weisbrod, & Bird, 1993). Overall, however, we see little reason 
for extra donative labor in nonprofit hospitals and expect that the weaker incen-
tives to hold down wages and the stronger urge to provide quality should lead 
to higher pay for RNs in nonprofit hospitals. That makes hospital RNs a tough 
case for the donative labor theory and increases the likelihood that nonprofit 
hospitals’ lower incentives to hold down costs will dominate. 
Hypothesis 1: RNs earn more in nonprofit hospitals than in public 
and for-profit hospitals. 
Wage Inequality in the Nonprofit Sector 
Leete (2000) argues that heavy reliance on intrinsically motivated employees 
who highly value fairness leads nonprofits to minimize pay differences across 
employees. She finds race and gender pay disparities to be about one third 
smaller in the nonprofit sector than in the for-profit sector. Despite a slowly 
narrowing gender pay gap, men still earn more than women even in highly fe-
male-dominated occupations like nursing (Blau & Kahn, 2000, 2006). Jones and 
Gates (2004) estimate that men earned 8% more than women in 2000 in nurs-
ing, and Muench, Sindelar, Busch, and Buerhaus (2015) calculate an average sal-
ary gap over US$5,000 in 2013. 
Will gender pay disparities for nurses be smaller in nonprofit hospitals, as 
Leete (2000) suggests? Faulk, Edwards, Lewis, and McGinnis (2012) suggest that 
smaller gender pay gaps in the nonprofit sector may be due to the high concen-
tration of low-paying industries and female-dominated occupations in the non-
profit sector, largely due to men accepting lower pay in female-dominated oc-
cupations in the nonprofit sector. Compensation of nurses may not follow this 
pattern, because nursing jobs require higher skills and pay better than most non-
profit jobs. Furthermore, if RNs in nonprofit hospitals earn as much as compa-
rable RNs in public and for-profit hospitals, nonprofit hospitals are unlikely to 
have substantially more intrinsically motivated nurses or to face much stronger 
resistance to pay inequities than for-profit hospitals. 
Ben-Ner, Ren, and Paulson(2011) pose a similar question using five human ser-
vices industries (nursing homes, child care, group homes, vocational rehabilita-
tion, and housing services) in Minnesota. They argue that for-profit firms use fi-
nancial incentives more often than nonprofit or local governments and that these 
incentives typically create inequality. On the contrary, they cite literature showing 
that nonprofit managers are more intrinsically motivated (Handy, Mook, Ginie-
niewicz, & Quarter, 2007; Mirvis & Hackett, 1983) and receive lower wages (Bal-
lou & Weisbrod, 2003; Preyra & Pink, 2001; Roomkin & Weisbrod, 1999). They 
argue that nonprofit managers typically do not use their discretionary power to 
increase their own compensation, although they could, and Ben-Ner, Ren, and 
Paulson (2011) find smaller wage inequalities in the same occupations in non-
profit and local government organizations than in for-profit businesses.  
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Although a meta-analysis of 34 studies finds that gay and bisexual men make, 
on average, 11% less than comparable heterosexual men (Klawitter, 2015), Lewis 
(2010) finds that the pay disparity is smaller in nonprofits than in government 
or the for-profit sector, echoing Leete’s findings for gender and race pay dispari-
ties. Patterns might be different in nursing, however. Gay and bisexual men may 
experience wage penalties due both to the stigma of homosexuality and to their 
higher tendency to work in lower paid occupations with higher percentages of 
female co-workers (Black, Gates, Sanders, & Taylor, 2000; Blandford, 2003; Tilc-
sik, 2011). Focusing on gay and straight male nurses, however, eliminates occu-
pational differences, and straight nurses are also dealing with the widespread 
stereotype of male nurses as gay (Harding, 2007), suggesting that the nursing 
profession should be more accepting of male nurses with same-sex partners. 
Hypothesis 2: Pay disparities based on gender, race/ethnicity, and 
relationship status may be smaller in nonprofit hospitals. 
Selection Into Nonprofit Hospitals 
Although our comparison of a single occupation across sectors reduces poten-
tial selection bias, some selection issues remain. However, donative labor theory 
suggests that the most altruistic nurses choose to work for nonprofit hospitals 
because they value their mission more highly and may accept lower pay to be 
able to do so. Alternatively, hospitals may become nonprofits to build consumer 
trust and may help build trust by hiring the most-qualified nurses, a strategy 
they can pursue because they have more surplus. Quality differences that are 
not captured by our education and experience measures will show up as a pay 
advantage rather than a higher quality workforce. 
Previous scholars have dealt with selection issues in a variety of ways. Us-
ing the Current Population Survey (CPS) Outgoing Rotation Groups, Ruhm and 
Borkoski (2003) find that nursing and personal care workers who switch sec-
tors (while presumably maintaining their same altruism and quality levels) 
see approximately the same pay effects as their cross-sectional analyses of the 
broader CPS predict. Using more recent years of the same data source, Schum-
acher (2009) gets approximately the same result, suggesting that selection ef-
fects are minor in sectoral differences in pay for nurses. 
Byrne (2014) argues that the large proportion of nonprofit hospitals with re-
ligious affiliations enables him to account for self-selection, as those will attract 
more religious employees with altruistic motives. Using data from the 2006 
CPS, he finds a similar wage premium in religious and nonreligious nonprofit 
hospitals. Jones (2015) argues that the nonprofit wage penalty exists primarily 
in industries and locations where nonprofit demand is relatively low; when an 
industry or location has many nonprofits, they hire all the altruistically moti-
vated workers and must raise their wages to attract additional employees. He 
finds that the nonprofit wage premium is highest in industries with the larg-
est shares of nonprofits, especially for higher educated workers (using both the 
5% sample from the 2000 Census and firm-level data for nursing homes), and 
that the difference between nonprofit and for-profit workers in job satisfaction 
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and in engagement in prosocial activities is larger in industries with fewer non-
profit employers (using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997). Given 
the large number of nonprofit hospitals, this is an additional reason to expect 
little impact of the donative labor hypothesis in this case. In sum, Ruhm and 
Borkoski (2003), Byrne (2014), and Jones (2015) suggest that selection bias is 
not a concern for our study, and Schumacher (2009) suggests that the selection 
bias should be very small. We perform additional sensitivity analyses, however, 
to ensure that selection bias does not affect our estimates. 
Although Ruhm and Borkoski (2003) and Schumacher (2009) have exam-
ined nursing pay differentials across different hospital ownership, we provide 
a more complete and current picture. First, data from the ACS provide a much 
larger sample size than the Current Population Survey (especially the Outgo-
ing Rotation Groups); our sample includes nearly 90,000 RNs, compared with 
about 3,000 RNs in previous studies using the CPS. Second, the nursing profes-
sion experienced a shortage between 1998 and 2006-2007 (Auerbach, Buerhaus, 
& Staiger, 2007). During and after the Great Recession, a surge in the number 
of RNs contributed to reversing this shortage (Auerbach, Buerhaus, & Staiger, 
2011; Buerhaus, Auerbach, & Staiger, 2009). 
Data and Method 
We use data from the 2005-2013 ACS.1 We restrict our analysis to RNs who work 
in nonfederal hospitals. These nurses should have very similar duties across 
sectors, and their large numbers (nursing is the largest occupation both in the 
health care industry and in the nonprofit sector) allow strong comparisons of 
similar workers in different sectors. We restrict our sample to nurses who work 
full time (at least 36 hr a week for at least 50 weeks) and are between the ages 
of 21 and 65. We exclude unemployed nurses and drop individuals with missing 
or imputed information on earnings, as Bollinger and Hirsch (2012) show that 
the Census Bureau’s wage-imputation process implicitly assumes that all sec-
tors pay equally. Our sample includes 89,289 RNs. 
Dependent Variable 
The ACS reports the wages and salaries of RNs in the past year. We convert earn-
ings into constant 2012 dollars using the consumer price index. In our regres-
sion models, we use the natural logarithm of annual earnings as our dependent 
variable. This decreases the skew of the wage distribution, and most indepen-
dent variables are more likely to have a constant percentage than a constant dol-
lar impact on earnings. We dropped the top and bottom 1% of earners to elimi-
nate misleading outliers. 
Sector of Employment 
We divide our RNs into three groups based on whether they report working for 
nonprofit, for-profit, or public hospitals. We perform most analyses separately 
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for these three groups but occasionally use two dummy variables to distinguish 
nurses in nonprofit and public hospitals from nurses in for-profit hospitals (the 
reference group). 
Control Variables 
We include the standard control variables for earnings determination models, 
with slight modifications. We use six dummy variables for education, and we 
measure age in both years and years-squared, to capture the expected curvilin-
ear relationship between age and compensation. We include the natural loga-
rithm of usual hours worked per week. As gender pay disparities can differ by 
race, we use race and gender interaction terms (e.g., White male, White female, 
Black male, etc.) to examine pay disparities. We also create six interaction terms 
between relationship status and gender, distinguishing nurses with different-
sex partners, nurses with same-sex partners, and single nurses from married 
nurses of the same sex (the reference group). ACS data only identify partnered 
gay men and lesbians, which may affect generalizability to single gay and lesbian 
nurses, though meta-analysis finds no evidence that estimates based in Census 
data overstate gay–straight differences (Klawitter, 2015). We also include sets of 
dummy variables to account for citizenship status, Metropolitan Statistical Area 
(MSA), state of employment, and year. We run separate ordinary least squares 
regressions models for each sector. 
Results 
Pay Differences Between Sectors 
In 2005, the mean salaries of nurses were nearly identical in nonprofit and pub-
lic hospitals but were about 5% lower in for-profit hospitals. By 2013, mean sal-
aries had risen about US$1,000 in constant dollars in nonprofit hospitals and 
by US$2,000 in public hospitals, but they had fallen slightly in for-profit hospi-
tals. Thus, nonprofit earnings had fallen 1.5% below public earnings but pulled 
7.2% ahead of those in the for-profit sector. 
The average nurse is a White female college graduate in her 40s. Over this 
period, 41% had associate’s degrees, 47% had bachelor’s degrees, and 11% had 
graduate degrees. Nursing remains an overwhelmingly female occupation: only 
11% are men. Nurses are also disproportionately White and Asian; Whites and 
Asians make up 75% and 10% of nurses, respectively, compared with 70% and 
5% of the rest of the workforce.2 Contrary to the stereotype of gay male nurses, 
69.5% of male nurses are married or heterosexually partnered, compared with 
69.9% of other men in the workforce. Consistent with the stereotype, however, 
male nurses are 5 times as likely as other employed men to have same-sex part-
ners (2.6% vs. 0.5%).3 Nurses are as likely as other working Americans to be 
native-born U.S. citizens (83.5%), but nurses are more likely than other em-
ployees with at least an associate’s degree to be immigrants (15.4% vs. 12.9%). 
Patterns vary across the sectors. Over the period as a whole, nurses in pub-
lic hospitals earned US$1,600 more than nurses in nonprofit hospitals, who 
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earned US$3,600 more than nurses in for-profit hospitals (Table 1). Nurses in 
for-profit hospitals were also the least experienced and educated and the least 
likely to be male and Asian, however, all of which could help explain their lower 
pay. Public hospital nurses were about 1 year older than nurses in nonprofit hos-
pitals, who were 1.8 years older than those in for-profit hospitals. About 61% 
Table 1. Comparison of Nurse Compensation Across Hospital Ownership
 Nonprofit  Public  For-profit
Wage (annual)  67,169  68,796  63,502
Age  44.5  45.6  42.7
Education
High school or less  0.4  0.5  0.6
Some college  4.1  3.2  3.4
Associate degree  36.1  35.4  42.9
College graduate  46.7  47.5  44.1
Professional degree  1.6  2.1  1.9
Masters  9.6  11.0  7.0
PhD  0.3  0.3  0.2
Women  88.7  85.5  90.1
White  74.6  52.7  68.8
Black  4.5  12.4  7.0
Hispanic  2.7  4.8  4.2
Asian  5.7  13.9  8.9
Other  1.2  1.7  1.3
Married  56.7  53.1  58.1
Partnered  4.1  3.5  4.6
Same-sex partner  0.5  0.4  0.4
Unpartnered  27.4  28.4  26.9
Men  11.3  14.5  9.9
White  9.3  9.4  7.2
Black  0.4  1.5  0.6
Hispanic  0.5  1.0  0.7
Asian  0.9  2.3  1.3
Other  0.2  0.2  0.2
Married  8.0  9.6  6.7
Partnered  0.6  0.6  0.5
Same-sex partner  0.4  0.3  0.2
Unpartnered  0.5  4.0  2.5
Noncitizen  2.8  4.9  4.2
Naturalized citizen  7.8  20.5  11.4
Usual hours worked  40.9  41.4  40.8
Lives in an MSA  36.8  40.5  38.0
Observations  36,776  7,225  45,288
MSA: Metropolitan Statistical Area.
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and 58% of nurses in public and nonprofit hospitals, respectively, were college 
graduates, compared with 53% of those in for-profit hospitals, who were also 
the least likely to have graduate degrees. Nurses in nonprofit hospitals were the 
least diverse—the most likely to be White (84%, vs. 62% and 76% in public and 
for-profit hospitals) and the least likely to be immigrants (10.6% vs. 25.4% and 
15.6%). Nurses in all sectors worked similar hours weekly. We also examined 
whether the composition of nurses differs by gender (Table 2) and did not no-
tice substantial differences. 
Table 3 shows that location, hours worked, education, and age explain most 
but not all of pay differences across sectors. Race, gender, citizenship, and re-
lationship status, however, played little role in the pay gaps. We entered the in-
dependent variables sequentially in eight separate models and tracked changes 
in the coefficients on public and nonprofit as we added independent variables. 
Thus, nurses in public and nonprofit hospitals earned 8.4% and 6.3% more than 
nurses in for-profit hospitals in the same year (Model 1). The pay advantages to 
public and nonprofit employment decrease to 5.2% and increase to 6.6%, respec-
tively, if we compare nurses working in the same state in the same year (Model 
2).4 Controlling for that extra half-hour in the workweek for RNs in public hos-
pitals shrinks their unexplained pay advantage to 4.5%. Higher educational lev-
els in public and nonprofit hospitals explains another 1.1 percentage point of 
Table 2. Comparison of Gender and Race Composition Across Hospital Ownership.
 Nonprofit  Public  For-profit
Women
White  84.1  61.7  76.4
Black  5.1  14.5  7.7
Hispanic  3.1  5.6  4.6
Asian  6.4  16.2  9.8
Other  1.3  2.0  1.4
Married  63.9  62.1  64.5
Partnered  4.7  4.1  5.1
Same-sex partner  0.6  0.5  0.5
Unpartnered  30.8  33.3  29.9
Men
White  82.1  65.0  72.5
Black  3.6  10.5  5.7
Hispanic  4.4  7.1  7.0
Asian  8.3  16.1  13.0
Other  1.6  1.3  1.8
Married  70.4  65.7  67.2
Partnered  4.1  4.1  5.2
Same-sex partner  3.1  2.4  2.4
Unpartnered  22.3  27.8  25.2
Observations  36,776  7,225  45,288
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the pay gaps, and their higher age and experience levels account for another 
1.5 to 2.1 percentage points. Holding those variables constant, other character-
istics (race, gender, citizenship, and relationship status) cannot explain the re-
maining pay gaps. 
Nurses in nonprofit and public hospitals earn 3.9% and 1.1%, respectively, 
more than apparently comparable nurses in for-profit hospitals. The 2.8 per-
centage point pay gap between nurses in nonprofit and public hospitals is sig-
nificant at the .0001 level. Thus, the data support our first hypothesis, that com-
parable nurses earn more in nonprofit hospitals. 
Pay Differentials by Gender, Race, and Relationship Status 
Most of the independent variables in Model 8 had the expected effects (the first 
column of Table 4). RNs with associate’s degrees earned 6.9% less than those 
with bachelor’s degrees, and those with master’s degrees earned an additional 
15.7%. Married White females earned 7.8% less than comparable married White 
men (very similar to the estimates of Jones and Gates, 2004). Black and His-
panic women lagged 3% below White women, but Asian women made 5% more. 
Black men earned 9% less than White men, but pay gaps for Hispanic and Asian 
men were much smaller. 
Because of the interaction terms between gender and relationship status, the 
female coefficients somewhat overstate the gender pay gaps, as marital status had 
Table 3. Nurses Pay Differences Across Sectors Compared With the For-Profit Sector.
 Public  Nonprofit
Model 1 8.4**  6.3** 
   (Years) (19.6)  (26.7)
Model 2 5.1**  6.7**
   (years, states) (12.6)  (28.6)
Model 3 4.5**  6.5**
   (Model 2 + log hours) (11.3)  (28.7)
Model 4 3.4**  5.5**
   (Model 3 + education) (8.8)  (24.6)
Model 5 1.1**  4.0**
   (Model 4 + age, age2) (3.6)  (19.0)
Model 6 1.2**  4.0**
   (Model 5 + Race × Gender) (3.2)  (19.0)
Model 7 1.1**  4.0**
   (Model 6 + citizenship) (2.9)  (19.1)
Model 8 1.1**  3.9**
   (Model 7 + relationship) (3.1)  (19.0)
89,289 observations
The coefficients reported are exponentiated and converted to percentages. T statistic presented 
in parentheses.
* p < .05 ; ** p < .01
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almost no impact on pay for women, but married men earned about 4% more than 
heterosexually partnered men and 7% more than single men. Thus, unexplained 
gender pay differences are smaller for every relationship status other than mar-
ried. Lesbian, gay, bisexual (LGB)–heterosexual pay differences were smaller than 
in most studies of the general economy (Klawitter, 2015): male nurses with male 
partners earned only a statistically insignificant 1.8% less than married men, and 
partnered lesbian nurses made 3.5% more than married female nurses. 
Gender, Race, and Relationship Pay Differentials Between 
Sectors 
The final three columns in Table 4 show separate regressions for nonprofit, pub-
lic, and for-profit hospitals to test whether pay disparities are smaller in the non-
profit and public sectors. We find little evidence to support that hypothesis. As be-
fore, the reference group is married White men with bachelor’s degrees, and the 
interaction terms complicate interpretation. The interaction terms with male are 
straightforward. The Black male coefficient, for instance, shows that the expected 
salary difference between comparable Black and White men is largest (12.3%) in 
public hospitals and smallest in nonprofit hospitals (5.9%). Asian male nurses 
also earn 3.5% less than comparable White male nurses, which seems to be driven 
mainly by the nonprofit sector. The 95% confidence intervals show substantial 
overlaps between hospital types for the other racial/ethnic groups. Likewise, al-
though the point estimate suggests that male nurses with same-sex partners earn 
more than comparable married male nurses in public hospitals, none of the coef-
ficients is statistically significant and all could vary just due to chance. 
We also find a small wage premium (0.5%) for married women (or wage pen-
alty for single women), which is mainly driven by the for-profit sector (1%). This 
is consistent with recent studies showing a wage premium for marriage (even 
for women; for example, Dougherty, 2006; Glauber, 2007; Killewald & Gough, 
2013), although the debate between a wage premium and penalty for married 
women is hardly settled (Loughran & Zissimopoulos, 2009, for example, find a 
wage penalty). 
The pay difference between White male and female nurses is smallest in pub-
lic hospitals, but the other differences across sectors are not statistically signifi-
cant. Thus, the few statistically significant differences across sectors suggest less 
inequality in public, but not nonprofit, hospitals except for Black male nurses, 
who face the highest wage penalty in public hospitals (12.3% less than White 
male nurses). 
Sensitivity Analysis 
To test the possibility that selection effects bias our findings, we conduct addi-
tional analyses. Selection models such as Heckman (1979) or propensity score 
matching (e.g., Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008) have commonly been used to account 
for potential selection, but they typically rely on binary choice models (probit or 
logit) to estimate the probability of receiving the treatment (in our case, work-
ing for a nonprofit hospital). As our study examines three different hospital 
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Table 5. Multinomial Treatment Effects Model (mtreatreg).
 Public  Nonprofit  Wages
Public    0.02
   (1.57)
Nonprofit    0.10**
   (6.59)
Log hours  0.59**  −0.15*  0.38**
 (6.41)  (−2.26)  (45.73)
Age  0.02*  0.02**  0.03**
 (2.05) (3.29)  (49.69)
Age-squared  0.00  −0.00  −0.00**
 (0.28)  (−0.43)  (−38.39)
High school degree −0.51**  −0.70**  −0.21**
 (−2.64)  (−5.70)  (−12.28)
Some college  −0.27**  −0.09  −0.08**
 (−3.31)  (−1.93)  (−13.88)
Associate degree  −0.24**  −0.40**  −0.07**
 (−7.45)  (−20.95)  (−27.54)
Master’s degree  0.34**  0.33**  0.14***
 (6.77)  (10.54)  (35.79)
Professional degree −0.06  −0.35**  −0.00
 (−0.61)  (−5.40)  (−0.19)
PhD  −0.13  0.34*  0.09**
 (−0.46)  (2.07)  (3.88)
White female  −0.64**  −0.05  −0.02*
 (−7.54)  (−0.90)  (−2.53)
Black female  0.20*  −0.66**  −0.03**
 (2.18)  (−9.61)  (−3.55)
Hispanic female  −0.15  −0.53**  −0.04**
 (−1.39)  (−7.04)  (−4.16)
Asian female  −0.10  −0.57**  0.04**
 (−0.99)  (−7.77)  (4.19)
Other female  −0.05  −0.20*  −0.03*
 (−0.34)  (−2.05)  (−2.49)
Black male  0.75**  −0.59**  −0.09**
 (5.31)  (−4.59)  (−5.70)
Hispanic male  0.20  −0.56***  −0.01
 (1.29)  (−4.84)  (−0.62)
Asian male  0.24*  −0.51**  −0.03**
 (2.01)  (−5.51)  (−2.83)
Other male  −0.26  −0.29  0.01
 (−0.80)  (−1.40)  (0.26)
(continued)
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ownership types, we estimate models that account for multinomial treatment 
effects (Deb & Trivedi, 2006a, 2006b). This model (Table 5) suggests that, af-
ter accounting for this selection, the wage premium for nonprofit nurses is even 
larger (about 10%) and no wage differential exists between nurses working in 
public and for-profit hospitals. However, a likelihood-ratio test fails to reject the 
null hypothesis of exogenous treatment.5 We interpret this as either (a) there 
is no selection bias and our regression estimates provide a reliable estimate of 
the nonprofit (and public) wage premium for nurses, or (b) our regression esti-
mates underestimate the actual wage premium for nonprofit nurses. 
Conclusion 
Contrary to donative labor and intrinsic motivation theories, we find that aver-
age nursing salaries in nonprofit hospitals are higher than in for-profit hospitals. 
Table 5. (continued)
 Public  Nonprofit  Wages
Noncitizen  0.05  −0.28**  −0.01
 (0.71)  (−5.26)  (−1.67)
Naturalized citizen  0.34**  −0.27**  0.04**
 (6.23)  (−6.62)  (7.83)
Married male  −0.21*  0.14*  0.06**
 (−2.36)  (2.24)  (7.63)
Partnered male  −0.24  −0.05  0.02
 (−1.20)  (−0.41)  (1.24)
Same-sex partnered male −0.11  0.35*  0.04
 (−0.44)  (2.07)  (1.85)
Married female  −0.14**  −0.07**  −0.00
 (−4.31)  (−3.53)  (−0.24)
Partnered female  −0.08  −0.03  −0.00
 (−1.04)  (−0.72)  (−0.11)
Female same-sex partnered −0.12  −0.03  0.03*
 (−0.55)  (−0.20)  (2.06)
Lives in a MSA  −0.18**  −0.04*  0.05**
 (−6.01)  (−2.09)  (24.86)
Lambda_public  −0.01
 (−0.49)
Lambda_nonprofit   −0.07**
  (−4.02)
Observations  89,289  89,289  89,289
Excludes states and years in the selection equation. The wage model includes states and years.
Robust z statistics in parentheses. Log likelihood: −91,521.163. Log likelihood test statistic: 4.07; p
χ2(2) = .131 (fail to reject null hypothesis of exogeneity).
MSA: Metropolitan Statistical Area
* p < .05 ; ** p < .01
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This is partly because they attract more educated and experienced nurses, but 
they may attract those higher skilled nurses partly because they pay better. After 
accounting for differences in measurable characteristics (location, hours worked, 
education, age/experience, gender, and race), nonprofit hospitals still pay compa-
rable nurses 3.9% more than for-profit hospitals and 2.8% more than public hos-
pitals. After accounting for potential selection effects using a multinomial treat-
ment effect model, we find an even larger wage premium for nonprofit nurses 
(about 10%) and no wage differential for public nurses. This wage premium over 
for-profit hospitals could be a result of the tax advantage of nonprofit hospitals, 
their potentially higher quality of service, or a combination of both. We find little 
evidence that nonprofit hospitals have smaller wage disparities than public and 
for-profit hospitals. On the contrary, pay differentials by gender, race, and rela-
tionship status appear to be as large in nonprofit as in for-profit hospitals (per-
haps even larger), while public hospitals may have the smallest wage disparities. 
Thus, we find no support for the donative labor hypothesis that nonprofit 
employees accept lower pay than they would earn in the for-profit sector to be 
able to do more valuable, rewarding work and nor for the argument that non-
profit employees demand greater pay equity across groups. RNs may be an es-
pecially tough case, however; as members of the caring professions, nurses can 
feel they are benefiting society in any type of hospital, and they may not view 
nonprofit hospitals as providing more valuable service than any other type of 
hospital. If so, they could easily prioritize pay, benefits, and hours above hospital 
type in choosing an employer. Alternatively, although little research compares 
hospital sizes, the larger average size of nonprofit hospitals could explain some 
of the wage premium observed. A quick back-of-the-envelope calculation using 
numbers reported from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention annually 
shows that, on average, nonprofit hospitals have 160 beds, for-profit hospitals 
have 127 beds, and public hospitals have 116 beds. However, this would not ex-
plain the (small) wage premium of public nurses’ relative to for-profit nurses. 
In addition, MSA and state of employment could already partly account for some 
of these differences. Regardless, we cannot rule out this possibility. 
Of course, we have no information on benefits and overtime hours. State and 
local governments typically provide better retirement and health benefits than 
for-profit firms (Bender & Heywood, 2010), with substantial variation across 
states (Biggs & Richwine, 2014). We do not know whether these patterns hold 
for hospitals, however, but total compensation for nurses in public hospitals is 
probably higher relative to nurses in both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals than 
our estimates suggest. 
Despite these limitations, the findings from this study suggest that in the 
nursing profession, nonprofit hospitals offer wages that are more than compet-
itive and attract higher skilled nurses. Buerhaus, Staiger, and Auerbach (2000) 
argue that the RN workforce was aging and predicted a severe shortage of nurses 
over the following decade. These trends reversed, but the supply of nurses needs 
to remain steady to meet the increasing demand for health care services (Au-
erbach, Staiger, Muench, & Buerhaus, 2013). As a result, hospitals are compet-
ing to hire nurses and need to provide competitive pay. This may explain why 
nurses see no reason to donate their labor to nonprofit hospitals and why non-
profit hospitals are compensating them more.    
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Notes 
1. We do not use the much smaller 2001-2004 American Community Survey (ACS) sam-
ples before the ACS was fully implemented. 
2. Asians remain overrepresented in the nursing profession if we restrict the sam-
ple to those with at least an associate’s degree (9.7% vs. 6.5%), but Whites do not 
(75.3% vs. 74.0%). 
3. Female nurses are slightly less likely than other employed women to have same-sex 
partners (0.51% vs. 0.67%). 
4. Apparently, public hospitals tend to be concentrated in high-paying states and non-
profit hospitals in lower paying ones. 
5. Deb and Trivedi (2006a) recommend using a likelihood-ratio test, which is a test 
for the joint hypothesis that the lambdas (public and nonprofit) are equal to 0. The 
test compares the log-likelihood of the model where the treatment is endogenous 
with the one where the treatment is exogenous. In our case, we fail to reject the 
null hypothesis that the lambdas are 0. 
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